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Marx or Mosca? 
An Inquiry into the Foundations of 
Ideocratic Regimes 
Heinrich Best  
Abstract: »Marx oder Mosca? Eine empirische Untersuchung der Fundamen-
te ideokratischer Regime«. In John Higley’s and Michael Burton’s taxonomy 
of elite settings, ‘ideocratic elites’ are represented by regimes of the Soviet 
type. These regimes based their rule on an egalitarian ideology that legitimized 
inequalities as temporary abnormalities. According to Marx the abolition of 
private ownership of the means of production would ultimately lead to a class-
less society. Gaetano Mosca questioned this claim and argued that families 
would maintain and even strengthen their function in producing and reproduc-
ing a ‘ruling class’ (tantamount to the elite concept) in communist regimes. 
The present contribution examines these claims on the basis of GDR’s Central 
Cadres Database. Comprehensive empirical evidence is provided supporting 
Mosca’s claim of a persistent impact of families in the formation and reproduc-
tion of communist elites. 
Keywords: elite theory, Marxism, Leninism, communism, socialism, social 
inequality, nomenklatura, cadre. 
Communist Elitism 
In their seminal taxonomy of elite settings, John Higley and Michael Burton 
count the elites of Soviet-type communist societies among the class of ideo-
logically united or “ideocratic elites” (cf. Higley and Burton 2006, 1-32). These 
regimes base the legitimation and objectives of their rule on a universal ideol-
ogy that provides a binding framework for the order of all fields of society and 
particularly for the regimes’ organisation of power. The structure of rule is 
hierarchically stratified and highly centralized, with the top personnel of the 
state party providing its core. Societies of this type are of particular interest for 
elite theory and research, because they exemplify a hierarchical social and 
political order that is not based on the private ownership of the means of pro-
duction. The claim of elite theories that social and political hierarchies inevita-
bly continue to be produced and reproduced after the abolition of capitalism 
contradicts the utopian Marxist construct of a classless, de-etatised and de-
hierarchized socialism (cf. Best 2004a; 2009), which is why representatives of 
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Marxism-Leninism have denounced the concept of the elite as “part of the 
reactionary wing of bourgeois ideology” and an “expression of the claim for 
power of the most reactionary part of monopolist bourgeoisie” (cf. Wörterbuch 
1983, 156-57). Consequently the concept of an elite was discarded by orthodox 
Marxists, and the term “elite” is still regarded as improper by former leaders of 
socialist regimes (Best and Hornbostel 2003; Salheiser 2009a).  
Nevertheless, there are multiple synonyms of the term “elite” in the official 
language of socialist regimes: avant-garde, cadre, nomenklatura, leader, func-
tionary (Wörterbuch 1983 74-5, 398-400; Wagner 1999). There are also “clas-
sical” references. Marx (1964, 379), for example, had given reasons why lead-
ership would be necessary for any kind of “combined production,” pointing to 
the “uniformity of the process as the result of one commanding will ... just as 
with the conductor of an orchestra.” Similarly, Lenin (1989b, 92-5) demanded 
“party discipline” and “unopposed subordination under one uniform will” as it 
was required by “the dictatorship of the proletariat” to the same extent as any 
“machine-driven big industry.” Also, he did not see any “basic contradiction 
between Soviet (i.e. socialist) democracy and individuals exerting dictatorial 
power.” This power, he stated, comes from the Bolshevik party representing 
the people, and it was to be used to run the bourgeois state in its state of transi-
tion, without bourgeoisie. 
Here, the rigid structures of the rule of socialist elite sans la lettre become 
obvious: this elite – the top party leadership – is legitimized by functional and 
historic necessities in a way that is compatible to classical elite theories. In 
Lenin’s theory of the state, the rule of a socialist elite is legitimized by the 
Communist Party’s “leading role” as a revolutionary avant-garde and by the 
functional necessities of the state. The leadership and planning functions of 
society are basically open to “any qualified and participating worker” – but the 
new system of rule must be oriented towards the world-historic objectives of 
socialist development. The purposeful mode of recruiting the revolutionary 
cadre and leadership functionaries, Lenin assumed, would result in leadership 
superior to the ruling minorities of bourgeois society (Lenin 1989a, 731-9). The 
legitimacy of the socialist elite, therefore, was essentially based on meeting the 
ideological criteria of communist ideocracies, meaning that it is particularly 
appropriate to test the congruity of the criteria set by the official ideology 
against the reality, that is, against the actual practices of socialist states (Higley 
and Pakulski 2000).  
However, after the October Revolution of 1917, it became increasingly dif-
ficult for communists to maintain congruity between their political practice and 
ideological claims. It became clear that their unconstrained use of force and the 
totalitarian scope of their rule matched, and in some respects exceeded, the 
etatised violence of “ordinary” tyrannies. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks upheld 
the vision of an egalitarian future, where the elimination of private Capital 
(with a capital “C”) would bring about the abolition of major social inequalities 
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and the reduction of power differentials (Trotsky 1967). Everything, the Bol-
sheviks claimed, would depend on the course of social and political develop-
ment after the transition to socialism. But would it be possible to prevent the 
communist party “avant-garde” from developing into a closed, hereditary and 
privileged “ruling class”? This raises further questions: What would happen to 
an ideocracy if the mismatch between ideology and reality persisted in the 
course of social and political development? How would the communist elites – 
and the populations of communist countries – react to such a mismatch?  
Elite theories of the “realistic” Machiavellian school had challenged the 
claim (made by Marxists and radical democrats) that egalitarian societies and 
polities are possible under the conditions of advanced industrialisation (Burn-
ham 1941; Burnham 1943). They had identified power differentials as a univer-
sal feature of all complex societies, independent of their form, and regardless of 
who controls the means of production. In the 1923 edition of his ‘Ruling 
Class’, Gaetano Mosca (English publication 1939) extended the idea of an 
inevitable social closure of the ruling class even further. All social orders, he 
claimed, showed a tendency to close ranks and to restrict access to the upper 
echelons to the kin of actual position holders, which also applied to Soviet-type 
socialist societies. Mosca argued that this “abuse,” usually associated with the 
existence of private property, would be even worse in a “collectivistic society.” 
The reason he gave was that the merger of economic and political powers in 
such a society provided established power holders with significantly broader 
control over the recruitment and socialisation of leadership candidates than in a 
bourgeois society, and that these established power holders (elites) would in-
evitably use this broad control to favour their own offspring. Mosca pointed to 
the family as the main distributor of favours and privileges, and insisted that 
family loyalties would override any egalitarian norms. Consequently, in order 
to establish an egalitarian society, Mosca initially considered the abolition of 
the institution of the family as a necessary complement to the abolition of pri-
vate property. However, he subsequently dismissed this idea and maintained 
that favouritism would find its way into the ruling classes, even if families were 
dissolved.  
Mosca’s argument about the inevitability of favouritism is not only anthro-
pological, in that he sees all humans as disposed to favour their offspring and 
close friends, but also functional, in that it is desirable for a peaceful and effi-
cient functioning of society that starting conditions in the competition for ele-
vated positions are not equal. He also suggests that intense social competition 
between large numbers of contenders may lead to a waste of energy in pursuit 
of egotistical goals; praises the advantages of a multigenerational process of 
maturation of leadership; and sees the transmission of privileges as compatible 
with the accumulation of collective and moral qualities which aid good ruling.  
These observations set the agenda for intense theoretical and ideological de-
bates about the nature and prospects of socialist societies. These debates had as 
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their main theoretical question and empirical problem: Did the family matter as 
a means of production and reproduction of social inequality, although private 
ownership of the means of production (i.e. Capital in the Marxian sense) had 
been abolished? The basic and fairly uncontroversial assumption in these de-
bates was that socialist societies were characterized by social inequalities. 
Although official self-descriptions of socialist societies emphasized their egali-
tarian (“classless”) character, everyone realised that many elements in Marxist-
Leninist ideology and policy also stressed and reinforced hierarchy. In particu-
lar, the communist party leadership regularly took the role of the “avant-garde” 
i.e. being the principal guide of society and the economy. This was comple-
mented by the system of “democratic centralism” that endowed central authori-
ties with an unchallenged control of societal development, as well as the power 
to select the leaders of all spheres of society. In all, this created a wide and 
rigid social hierarchy. The party nomenklatura epitomized this openly hierar-
chical nature of “real socialism” (Wagner 1999; Kupferberg 2002; Brown 
2009). It was also apparent that political inequality correlated with an unequal 
access to material goods, valid information, and symbolic rewards, but this 
inevitable “vertical differentiation” was validated by official propaganda as a 
necessary means of attaining socialist goals, and as a way to protect socialist 
achievements: full egalitarianism was to be postponed until the final and total 
victory of socialism. 
The actual inequality in supposedly egalitarian societies of the socialist type 
was also legitimized by social openness and (ideological) merit. Both were 
illustrated, as the propaganda machine stressed, by a privileged access of can-
didates with a working-class background to leadership positions. In view of 
such socialist self-attributions, social background related leadership candidates 
to the “masses”, especially the “working masses”. According to the egalitarian 
doctrine of the party, it was not legitimate, however, to allow hereditary or 
gender-based recruitment (Best 2009; Brown 2009). Family relations, parental 
or conjugal, were not supposed to interfere with the even-handed work of cen-
tral authorities. It was maintained that, with the abolition of private ownership 
of the means of production, the family had ceased to be a unit of social repro-
duction.  
These claims made it difficult for Marxist-Leninist insiders to criticise the 
highly stratified communist regimes. An example is Trotsky (1937), who 
fiercely attacked the “bureaucratic” character of Stalin’s nomenklatura, but 
defended its ideological basis in the Leninist concept of an “avant-garde” of 
professional revolutionaries. Trotsky also denied the transformation of the 
nomenklatura into a “class”, because the cadres had not (yet?) appropriated the 
means of production. A remote shadow of Trotsky’s position can be found in 
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “political capital” (1991), which refers to the 
control of resources of power (including control over elite recruitment) exer-
cised by the socialist state and held by party and state functionaries. The an-
 77
tagonism between the functionaries and elites who derive their status from 
specialist knowledge (i.e. cultural capital) reflects this division (c.f. also Ludz 
1968). However, Bourdieu also maintains that there is a strong meritocratic 
element in the transfer of political capital, making it difficult to identify the 
stratum of power holders as a distinct “class”.  
The last and decisive step in the direction of Mosca’s early diagnosis of a 
communist elite (“ruling class”) was made by “new class” theorists like 
Milowan Djilas (1983) and Michael S. Voslensky (1984), both of whom identi-
fied the social closure and self-reproduction of the ruling class as inherent 
qualities of Soviet type socialist societies and polities. With these diagnoses, 
they shattered the corner stone of Marxist-Leninist ideology, namely, that the 
establishment of party rule and the hierarchical system of the nomenklatura 
were reversible steps on the way towards a classless and egalitarian society. 
They also pointed to the inherent instability of a power structure and a system 
of socialist inequality. The reality of this socialist inequality delegitimized and 
thereby destabilized the entire “real socialism” (c.f. also Konrad and Szelényi 
1979). 
Empirical Access to an Obsolete Society:  
The Central Cadre Database (ZKDS) 
Empirical research into “real socialism” has challenged the ideological claims 
and self-descriptions, especially those propagated by party officials and their 
mouthpieces in Marxist-Leninist “social science”. In particular, it could be 
shown that from the 1960s onwards there were tendencies towards social clo-
sure and increasing self-recruitment in the “service classes” of several socialist 
countries. During the whole period of communist rule in Europe, for example, 
women were consistently disadvantaged in recruitment for leadership positions. 
On the other hand, there were also strong indications that during the initial 
period of socialist transformation, socialist societies offered good opportunities 
for upward mobility to contenders with a lower-class background, especially 
when compared with western capitalist societies (Mayer 1994; Solga 1994). 
However, crucial theoretical and empirical problems of a sociology of so-
cialism, such as a reconstruction of the social mechanisms that brought about 
the reproduction of social differentiations in socialist societies, are still to be 
addressed. For example, it is evident that economic capital could not play the 
“transmitting role” in a society where private ownership of the means of pro-
duction was replaced by state ownership. In particular, the role of families as 
contexts and agents in processes of social differentiation needs further investi-
gation, because they are the most probable source of “illegitimate” differentia-
tion – “illegitimate” according to the criteria of socialist ideologies (Best 2009; 
Salheiser 2010). In light of the strict control over fields of research where ideo-
logically undesirable findings might have been unearthed, little systematic – 
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although quite a lot of anecdotal – evidence is available. In particular, the lead-
ership of socialist societies did not want to be investigated and remained more 
or less inaccessible to any serious sociological inquiry. 
A breakthrough occurred after the collapse of European communism in the 
1990s. The ZKDS (Zentraler Kaderdatenspeicher) or Central Cadre Database 
(CCD), which provided a complete machine-readable inventory of the GDR’s 
functional elite (Best and Hornbostel 2003; Remy 2003; Salheiser 2009a) could 
be saved, reconstructed and made available for social science research. The 
CCD, which was compiled during the 1980s under the auspices of the GDR’s 
Council of Ministers, contained full records of about 700,000 persons covering 
their social and political family backgrounds, party and organizational affilia-
tions, status in the nomenklatura, military service, their family situations in the 
1980s, occupational careers, educational backgrounds, special skills and quali-
fications, and further information concerning their cadre status, such as the 
entitlement to travel to Western countries. The data also identified their posi-
tion (level of appointment in nomenklatura), as well as them having relatives in 
the West. The recording practices that generated the CCD data were a direct 
inheritance of Stalinism, with its obsession about hidden enemies and potential 
traitors, and the fact that the CCD was established indicates the importance of 
this information for the cadre policies and decisions.  
A grid of cadre characteristics, which was developed in the early 1950s for 
recording details of party officials, was later extended to all cadres and, with 
few changes, remained in use until the end of the GDR. The grid comprised 
180,000 files referring to leaders at elite and sub-elite level (e.g. high-level 
administrators up to the positions of ministers), managers of the socialist econ-
omy (up to the level of directors of collective combines), and other leading 
personnel from almost all parts of GDR society during the 1980s, but excluded 
full time party functionaries and officers in the military and the security ser-
vices. These security personnel data were stored in other databases that were 
either destroyed or remain unavailable. Nevertheless, even this incomplete 
Orwellian project of the CCD generated an immensely valuable database for 
research into the formal and informal mechanisms of recruitment and the de-
velopment of careers within the socialist cadre apparatus – the socialist power 
elite. In fact, it became even more valuable when it was found to contain sev-
eral hundred thousand full records of persons of non-cadre status, thus provid-
ing a reference for comparisons between power/status groups of the GDR soci-
ety. 
Earlier studies of the CCD have shown that there was no homogeneous re-
gime of cadre recruitment or advancement that transcended individual sectors 
of GDR society (Best 2004a; Best 2004b; Salheiser 2005; Salheiser 2008; 
Salheiser 2010). Although loyalty to the regime and qualification for the execu-
tive function were mandatory prerequisites for cadre positions, the relative 
weight attributed to those prerequisites, and the relevance of other criteria, 
 79
varied between sectors. This meant that there was no single, standardised sys-
tem of recruitment, making it appropriate to follow a sector-specific approach 
and to look for communalities and differences in cadre recruitment in specific 
sectors of GDR society.  
In the present study I focussed on the GDR’s nationalised manufacturing in-
dustry (“Verarbeitendes Gewerbe”) or production sector, which included indus-
tries such as the motor industry, mechanical and electrical engineering, and the 
central state administration (“Zentrale Staatsorgane”) which, among others, 
comprised the staff of ministries and central planning bureaucracies (Best 
2004b; Best 2007). The production sector had a leading role in providing the 
resources for the reproduction of the GDR society (including showpieces like 
the Zeiss works in Jena), while the central state administration sector was a 
central pillar of the power apparatus (including the GDR’s diplomatic service). 
Within each sector, specific institutional practices and rules for cadre recruit-
ment were applied, and the cross-over of cadres between sectors was relatively 
rare. Where it did occur, it mostly included the professional apparatus of party 
and mass organizations. It was possible and appropriate, therefore, for further 
analyses to choose the reference group of “non-leaders” from within each sec-
tor and to compare their recruitment and career-patterns with those of high 
ranking leaders of the same sector. I decided to dichotomize the data by draw-
ing a line between lower and upper level cadres, with foremen and work team 
leaders (“Brigadiers”) allocated to the lower category, and department leaders 
and group leaders in ministries allocated to the upper level. Top positions were 
made up of ministers and directors of Combines1. The bulk of the lower-level 
reference category was, however, made up of secretaries, drivers, and produc-
tion workers, including scientific staff in low hierarchical positions. 
The study uses various causal models to identify sector-transcending and 
sector-specific determinants of careers. Special emphasis is placed on the effect 
of cadres’ conjugal affiliations and parental family backgrounds. “Legitimate” 
factors of socialist cadre recruitment, such as loyalty to the regime and formal 
qualifications, were introduced as control variables and operationalized through 
communist party (SED = Socialist Unity Party) membership and formal educa-
tion of the cadre. A further control variable was the age at which the highest 
position of the cadre was reached, which accounts for age-differences between 
the target group (leaders) and the control group (non-leaders). Conjugal affilia-
tions and parental family backgrounds are possible “illegitimate” factors influ-
encing the recruitment and careers of socialist leaders. These factors were 
captured by 12 indicators that comprise the marital status of cadres (married, 
divorced, having children), their social origin (worker, intelligentsia, “bour-
geois,” including leaders with a business or large scale agricultural back-
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or VEB). 
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ground), their political origin (pre-1945 membership of parents in NSDAP 
(National Socialist Party) or KPD/SPD (Communist/Social Democratic Party), 
post-1945 membership of parents in SED, and finally, the social position and 
political affiliation of their spouse (leading cadre, intelligentsia, SED). 
Earlier studies of CCD data showed that women were not only heavily un-
derrepresented in leading cadre positions, but also that women’s careers in such 
positions followed different tracks and were subject to different underlying 
rules (Best and Hornbostel 2003; Best 2004b). I have therefore calculated the 
models of career determinants not only for sectors, but also for men and 
women separately. I have further differentiated between age cohorts (those 
born before and after 1945) to identify changes in cadre policy and social mo-
bility opportunities throughout the history of the GDR. Altogether, eight causal 
models for distinct sub-populations were tested through logistical regression 
analysis (see Table 1). This technique uses maximum-likelihood estimations to 
predict a dichotomous dependent variable (in this case, the inclusion or non-
inclusion in the upper echelon of the cadre system of the respective sector) on 
the basis of a set of independent variables of any measurement level (in this 
case, the career determinants mentioned above). Interpretations are based on 
standardized odds and their significance levels. Although we technically have a 
complete census of the cadres in both sectors of GDR economy and polity, I 
have made a heuristic use of inferential statistics to reduce the complexity of 
the data to be interpreted. I have, therefore, also distinguished between the 
“positive enforcing” and “negative impeding” effect of the researched charac-
teristics on cadres’ careers.  
Family Relations as a Career Determinant  
in a Socialist Society: Empirical Results 
A first inspection of the control variables shows, with one remarkable excep-
tion, their expected effects on career opportunities: SED membership and aca-
demic education consistently improved career prospects for managers and 
administrators (Table 1). We also see that members of the “leading cadres” 
reach their highest positions at a later age than members of the reference 
groups. The one exception is female leading cadres from the older cohort in 
higher administration, who reached their top positions at a younger age than 
their same-sex colleagues in non-leadership positions. This result needs further 
clarification, but it is probably the consequence of a combination between 
affirmative action and a glass-ceiling effect, with women of the older cohort 
being recruited into elevated positions in the administrative sector at a rela-
tively young age, but being excluded from further promotion. However, the 
underlying pattern is clear: there has been discrimination against women in 
both sectors studied here. This may not be fully revealed by the models pre-
sented in Table 1, because gender was used as a classification variable, but in 
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other studies women were found to have been almost completely absent in the 
highest echelons of GDR’s functional elites (Best and Hornbostel 2003). A 
comparison between age cohorts reveals that little changed in this respect dur-
ing the existence of the GDR. Only at the middle level of authority are the 
effects of gender discrimination somewhat reduced because younger females 
had a better chance of rising into the middle stratum of leadership positions 
than their older, same sex colleagues (Best 2004b). A strong negative effect of 
being female also appears in separate models (not presented here) that include 
gender as an independent variable.  
Some of the mechanisms involved in discriminating against females are re-
vealed in the variables referring to family status (see Table 1). While there was 
a positive association between career success and reproduction for men, for 
females in the manufacturing sector having children was a clear disadvantage. 
Male cadres also profited from being married, while marital status did not have 
a significant effect on the careers of female cadres, with the exception of 
younger women in central administration, who seemed to profit (career-wise) 
from being married. Having a spouse from the cadre, or with an intelligentsia 
background, was common for cadres of both sexes in the manufacturing sector, 
and for older male cadres in the state administration sector. About 75 per cent 
of married female administrators in the state administration sector also had 
partners from the leadership stratum or with an intelligentsia background. In 
the causal model, however, having a high status husband does not result in a 
strong positive effect, because so many female leaders in the state administra-
tion sector were single or divorced. Thus, even the advantage of having a 
spouse with high status favoured men more than women. Only female leading 
cadres in the manufacturing sector profited from a husband who was himself a 
leading cadre or a member of the intelligentsia. 
A similarly “illegitimate” pattern of career advancement is revealed with re-
gard to working-class origin. In the manufacturing sector, coming from a work-
ing-class background had a consistently negative effect on career opportunities 
in all age and gender categories (cf. Salheiser 2005; 2008; 2009b): the same 
was found for older males in the central administration sector (cf. Gebauer 
2009). In the other models no significant effect of having a working-class 
background – negative or positive – is found. The contrast to the picture 
painted by the official propaganda of the communist regime is even more glar-
ing when we look at the case of cadres with a bourgeois background, i.e. those 
who had fathers involved in business, large-scale agriculture, or who were self-
employed. Coming from a bourgeois family, in fact, improved the odds of 
having a high status position, while in the same model the odds of success for 
descendants from a working-class background are significantly diminished. In 
the manufacturing sector, especially in the younger cohort, we see almost a 
return of the “old bourgeoisie” with one in five leaders coming from the stra-
tum of the self-employed. A family background in the intelligentsia had sig-
 82
nificant effects in only two of the eight models: it improved the odds of success 
for younger male cadres in the state administration sector, and it diminished the 
chances of success among younger men in the manufacturing sector. 
The “illegitimate” effects of political origin are even more glaring. Descent 
from a family with an NSDAP affiliation actually improved the career pros-
pects of cadres in all older cohorts and of younger females in the central ad-
ministration. A family affiliation with a pre-1945 working-class party, by con-
trast, diminished career prospects of older males and females in the 
manufacturing sector, while it improved the prospects of older males in the 
state administration sector significantly (Table 1). The fact that National So-
cialist (NS) family affiliations had consistently favourable career effects in all 
sectors and for both sexes indicates the presence of ‘illegitimate’ mechanisms 
underlying selection and self-selection (Best and Salheiser 2006; Best 2010). 
Indeed, there is some evidence that young candidates for party careers with a 
personal history of NSDAP membership were officially sponsored by the appa-
ratuses of the communist party and the state in the early period of the GDR 
(Best 2003; Judt 2005, 58-62), even though there was no official policy to 
justify or promote the inclusion of people with a National Socialist family 
background. I rather assume that there were multigenerational family strategies 
for upward social mobility, and that such strategies worked regardless of the 
hegemonic party in power, which until 1945 was the NSDAP, followed by the 
SED from 1946 until 1989. Ideological polarity and political hostility between 
these parties were overshadowed by the interest of families in safeguarding and 
improving their status in society.  
At the aggregate level, this assumption is supported by the positive effects 
SED family background had on careers in the models, where we also find sig-
nificant positive effects for having an NSDAP background. The only excep-
tions are younger female cadres in the central administration. At the individual 
level, we see a clear path connecting NSDAP and SED through inter-party 
mobility (Best and Salheiser 2006). Parties affiliated to the SED (Block-
parteien) seldom appeared in the career background of top officials. This even 
applied to the NDPD (National Democratic Party), which had been formed to 
serve as a repository for former Nazis. A transition from one hegemonic party 
in power to the other was a rational option when the fortunes of families were 
at stake; an option made possible, if not encouraged, by the SED. In other 
words, the overt ideology of antifascism was not meant to prevent GDR’s 
authorities from co-opting cadres with an NS background into leadership posi-
tions when it seemed opportune to do so. 
Another unexpected finding is that SED membership of family members 
diminished the odds for upward mobility in some subcategories of the manu-
facturing sector. I assume this to be the effect of a process of self-selection, in 
that the manufacturing sector was relatively distant to the centres of power and 
ideology and thereby a possible channel for upward mobility for those whose 
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social milieu were somewhat removed from the regime and its hegemonic 
party. This did not, however, exempt pretenders for cadre positions in the 
manufacturing sector with such backgrounds from joining the SED. The situa-
tion was completely different in the central administration sector, where we see 
the emergence of a noblesse d’état (Bourdieu 1989) with incumbents prefera-
bly coming from SED-related families and being married to SED-related 
spouses.  
Conclusion 
Who was right: Marx with his prediction that the abolishment of private capital 
would usher in an egalitarian society where everybody would find a place 
according to his or her abilities and needs; or Mosca who predicted that, in the 
absence of capitalism, families would maintain and even enhance their signifi-
cance as producers and reproducers of social inequality? The results of our 
study appear to favour Mosca’s conclusions. They paint a picture of a complex 
process of elite formation and reproduction in a Soviet-type society, with 
strong vertical and horizontal differentiations between hierarchical levels and 
sectors. The abolition of the private ownership of the means of production 
seems not to have prevented two seemingly universal laws of social differentia-
tion from working. Putnam’s (1976) famous “law of increasing disproportion,” 
which maintains that the share of disadvantaged categories of the population 
decreases the higher the social position, seems confirmed, as does Mosca’s 
(1939) equally well known “law of intergenerational status conservation,” 
which maintains that leadership groups tend to pass on their elevated status to 
the next generation by building supportive family ties. The first law is con-
firmed mainly by the steep decline in the share of female cadres in the higher 
echelons of the social and political system of the GDR; the second is consistent 
with the observation that in the GDR families continued to be units of social 
reproduction of “illegitimate” social properties.  
Not all of Mosca’s claims fare well, though. His assumption that “collecti-
vistic” societies will give rise to a hermetic system of social reproduction 
through the pooling of political and economic powers in a “super elite” does 
not hold true. The social reproduction of cadres in a socialist society remained 
a complex process, and was never as straightforward as in capitalist societies, 
i.e., through inheritance or exclusive private education. What we see in the 
GDR is an inherently contradictory pattern with clear differences between the 
sectors of the economy and the state. The economic sector was distant from the 
socio-political milieu of the hegemonic party and maintained some ties with the 
“old” classes and political milieus of the pre-socialist past. The state, by con-
trast, seems to have established a noblesse d’état with parental and conjugal 
family ties fostering strong attachments to the regime.  
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It is also evident that in the 1989-90 period of transition a cleavage opened 
between the two sectors studied here and that different reactions to regime 
change can be plausibly related to different modes of social reproduction in 
each sector. While the leading cadres in the manufacturing sector quickly 
abandoned their commitment to socialism and an independent GDR, the cadres 
of central state administration maintained their attachment to the “Socialist 
German State” and tried to promote the idea of a “third way”; a compromise 
between capitalism and socialism. Leading cadres in the GDR manufacturing 
sector could translate the insider knowledge they had accumulated in running 
their companies and Combines into career assets in a capitalist economy of a 
united Germany (Martens 2005; Martens 2007; Best 2007; Schmidt 2009) and 
were prepared, through their biographical and family backgrounds, to take 
leading roles in capitalist companies. Indeed, being well trained and experi-
enced in running technologically demanding production processes, they had a 
lot in common with their Western counterparts. Perhaps as important, giving up 
socialism for East German managers meant finishing with the all-controlling 
influence of the central cadre offices. This “reallocated” the responsibility for 
social reproduction to their families. 
There were fewer such incentives for the leading cadres of the central ad-
ministration to desert the project of socialism and an independent GDR. Their 
employer, the state, would disappear, and the insider knowledge they possessed 
would be almost worthless under the new regime, unlike the knowledge and 
skills of their managerial counterparts. But even for the leading cadres in the 
central administration sector there was hope. The family history of many of 
them showed that it had been possible to survive – or even thrive – in the GDR 
with an NSDAP background. In other words, even if the odds were bad, fami-
lies could develop strategies of successfully overcoming adverse starting condi-
tions for a career. Today’s East German political elite provides quite a few 
examples of children from the GDR’s noblesse d’état having returned to posi-
tions of power, with the post-communist PDS (former SED and recently re-
named DIE LINKE) being a particularly efficient vehicle for an intergenera-
tional reproduction of power (Best and Vogel 2011). We have also gained a 
valuable confirmation of Mosca’s sober (and sombre) prediction concerning 
the persistence and reproduction of the powerful and privileged “ruling class.” 
This continuity contributed to fissures in the power structure and the ideologi-
cal superstructure of the “ideocratic” regime, thus furthering its breakup and 
final collapse. Paradoxically, however, it also facilitated a smooth transition to 
a new regime (Higley and Pakulski 1995; Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski et al. 
1996; Higley, Pakulski and Wesołowski 1998). 
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